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University of Innsbruck 
Abstract: This study examines how employees internalize differences in social distance between 
themselves and their managers when they are competing for a reward given by the manager. In an 
employer/employee relationship, this difference in social distance between the employer and the various 
employees leads to a disadvantageous situation for the socially distant workers when raises, promotions, 
special considerations etc. are given. Since social distance is present in most organizations, 
understanding how employees work effort changes in response to changes in social distance is of upmost 
importance. In prior literature, this disadvantage has always been assumed/shown to lead to lower 
effort than the advantaged worker. The results partially back up this claim and show that females who 
are socially distant from their manager contribute much less than females who are socially closer or 
males regardless of the social distance.  
1. Introduction: 
“The typical worker operates in a setting where efforts are exerted in the hope of a promotion, 
salary revision, or bonus, which are typically at the discretion of superiors.” 
Prendergast (1999) 
Previous research has shown that in a simple setting, rewards are in fact an effective mechanism 
to elicit higher work effort from employees. However, this effectiveness is likely altered when the 
workers who are competing for the rewards vary in their social ties to their manager. Because social ties 
are a natural part of most corporate settings, this topic is of upmost importance. To illustrate why social 
distance may matter, suppose a manager has a reward she must give to one of two employees; one who is 
socially close to her (or part of the in-group) and one who is not (or part of the out-group). If both 
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† Department of Public Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria employees produce equal outputs, the manager would likely give the reward to the employee who is 
socially closer to her.
 2 More generally, there must be some threshold level of productivity for each 
worker where the manager is indifferent to giving the reward to the in- or the out-group member where 
this threshold will be lower for the in-group member than the out-group member. As a result, an out-
group member will have to work harder to garner the same rewards as an in-group member. It stands to 
reason that in this instance, work effort may be much different than when social ties are not considered. 
The question remains how these workers internalize the advantage or disadvantage. If workers see social 
ties as a substitute for work effort, the out-group employee will contribute more than the in-group 
employee. If employees internalize the inequity in a purely strategic manner, the reverse will be true. In 
order to better understand how to design an effective incentive mechanism, understanding how workers 
internalize social distance is of upmost importance. This paper will use experimental methods to explore 
this issue focusing on how workers compete, via work effort, for a reward when social distance is present.  
Since the reward structures used in organizations vary and the resulting response of the worker to 
these reward structures may also vary, rewards mimicking bonuses (can be given to multiple employees) 
and promotions (can be given to only one employee) will be taken into account. These two types of 
incentives are widely used as evidenced in the opening quote from Prendergast (1999), and pointed out by 
Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988). The Baker et al. study argues that a company will use a bonus system 
when there are few promotable opportunities. For instance, a CEO is already at the top of the ladder and 
thus not promotable. They also classify small firms with fewer hierarchical levels and firms in declining 
industries as more likely to use bonuses over promotions.  
In order to more closely examine the effect social ties have on employee competition, it must first 
be established that employees believe they are rewarded, at least partially, based on social distance from 
their superior. This seems to be an established fact both in the prior literature and in the popular press. As 
a specific example, social distance is a concern for current and potential telecommuters. These employees 
fear that once they are out of the office, their employers will forget about them when rewards are given 
out (Cooper and Kurland, 2002). This should be a concern for corporations wishing to take advantage of 
the cost saving measures tied to telecommuting. The popular view seems to be in line with the Kurland 
and Cooper study as evidenced in a Network World article which confirms this fear by stating that most 
executives believe office workers will be promoted before telecommuters.
3 The view that social distance 
is a determining factor for preferential treatment is held by office-based workers as well as seen by the 
                                                           
2 The social ties may make management feel more comfortable with certain workers when trust is needed for things 
such as implicit contracts (Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
3 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/011707-telecommute-career.html advice given in a recent Yahoo Hotjobs article titled How to get a raise. The author asserts “If you stay 
cloistered in your cubicle, you'll probably be disappointed when raises are announced--no matter how 
hard you work.”
4 This is in line with a recent survey conducted by Johnathon Gardner of Georgetown 
University where he finds that 92% of managers claim to have witnessed cases in their firm where 
favoritism played a role in who was promoted.
5  
Beyond the specific cases, or the popular view, Westphal and Stern (2006) show that social ties 
are important for employees to gain board positions where these social ties are substitutes for ability or 
background. Their study suggests that if an out-group worker desires a preferred position, they must exert 
more effort to build interpersonal relations. Kristof-Brown (2000) find similar results for appointments 
into management positions. As pointed out in Schulze et al. (2001), this effect is generalizable to 
employees not in management roles and shows that favoritism results in a decline in the returns on assets 
and market-to-book ratios. Bandiera et al. (2009) further show that managers in a fruit picking setting 
show favoritism towards those socially closer to them which generates higher potential payoffs for 
socially close workers but at a cost to the firm.  
Other lines of literature have examined how social distance affects employee effort after a reward 
is give. In these settings, social distance has been shown to evoke more reciprocal behavior (Chen and Li, 
2009) which either benefits the firm (Brandts and Sola, 2010) or harms the firm (Bandiera et al. 2009).
 6  
In these papers which study how group identity affects behavior, it is assumed that the manager makes the 
first move or is the bottleneck and the employee must respond. Though these studies look at social 
distance, they do not examine how social distance affects work effort when workers are competing for the 
prize.  
Though the current study was built around understanding how social distance affects work effort 
in the workplace, it is similar to previous studies of “unfair” tournaments (O’Keeffe, Viscusi and 
Zeckhouser (1984); Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987); Schotter and Weigelt (1992); Harbring and 
Irlenbusch (2003); Orrison, Schotter and Weigelt (2004)) and provides a nice compliment to many of 
these studies. One of the major focuses of previous studies of unfair tournaments was to understand how 
discrimination affected work effort. Experimentally, unfair tournaments were used where an “advantage” 
was induced for some workers since it is difficult to test things such as racial or gender discrimination. 
This means that how someone reacted to actual discrimination against them could not be directly studied. 
The basic finding when the advantage is induced is that anti-discrimination policies are quite effective. 
                                                           
4 http://hotjobs.yahoo.com/career-articles-how_to_get_a_raise-1164 
5 http://msb.georgetown.edu/story/1242672465197.html 
6 Refer to Chen and Li (2009) for a great review of this line of literature Since the focus of the present study is to look at social distance between the worker and the manager, a 
real person will decide the reward allocations and thus the discrimination will be endogenously 
determined. This addition will allow the present research to have broader implications for understanding 
discriminatory behavior since it provides a nice avenue to determine if/how participants internalize the 
previously induced discrimination. 
A third line of literature which is related to the current study focuses on how competitive 
outcomes differ by gender (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010; 
Sutter and Rützler, 2010; Wozniak, Harbaugh and Mayr, 2010; Gupta,  Poulsen and Villeval, 2011).  The 
basic finding of the Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini study was that as the competitiveness of the 
environment increases, males increase their effort more than females in a real effort experiment. Niederle 
and Versterlund (2007) further show that men select into competitive pay schemes twice as often as 
women. Sutter and Rützler (2010) find that this competitive drive of males is present as early as three 
years old. 
Taken as a whole, the above suggests that a reward that is meant to encourage higher work effort 
may actually have the opposite effect though confounding factors exist which make assertions about the 
direct influences of social distance on work effort difficult to ascertain. In order to cleanly identify these 
effects, lab experiments will be used. The sterile environment of the laboratory is an extremely useful tool 
in this scenario because of the inability in many field settings to observe work effort (even if productivity 
is observed), the employee's utility functions or the value of the reward to the workers; all of which can 
be controlled in the lab. The current paper will complement the existing literature in several important 
avenues. First, there is currently no concrete use of post-effort rewards with the presence of varying social 
distance. This paper introduces this factory by using two treatments meant to mimic a bonus or a 
promotion. Of the papers that do study post-effort rewards, non-induced advantages or disadvantages are 
rarely used. Because of this, experimental contests are usually ran in non-mediated environments. The 
research question necessitates the use of mediated contests and will build our understanding of behavior 
in this setting.  
2.1 Model - Risk-Neutral Workers   
In this section, a simple model of employee competition will be highlighted where some employees are 
socially closer to the manager than others. Predictions derived from this framework will be tested using 
experiments. Based on the reward structure used in corporations, the following model will consider how 
social distance affects work effort when the reward is similar to a promotion or when it is similar to a 
bonus. Similar to the terminology used in Cason, Masters and Sheremata (2010), promotions can be thought of as winner take all (WTA) contests while bonuses can be thought of as Proportional contests. 
The models rely on two primary assumptions; (1) how the worker internalizes the advantage or 
disadvantage and (2) their beliefs about what the person they are competing with will do. 
In this simple setup, we will assume that social distance is fixed and agents are risk neutral. When 
agents are risk-neutral, there will be no predicted difference in effort between the two contests so the 
following will apply to both contests. This is because a risk neutral worker views a proportion of the prize 
the same as the expected value of the prize. This assumption will be relaxed in the next section. It will 
also be assumed that a worker is endowed with an initial amount of time and can divide their effort 
between a productive task and an outside option. Thus, a worker’s payoff is a function of their value of 
the prize, their cost of effort and how much time they devote to their outside option.  In this simple setup, 
it will be assumed there are only two workers competing for the prize; one who is socially closer to the 
manager (an in-group employee) while the other is not (an out-group employee). With the addition of 
social distance, a manager will discount the work effort of the out-group worker by a factor of         or 
the manager views            where    represents the effort of the in-group worker and    the effort of the 
out-group worker.  With a non-linear cost function, the in-group (subscript i) and out-group (subscript o) 
workers have expected payoffs of: 








          
Where I is total effort available, M is the value of the prize, c is a constant cost parameter and      is the 
probability the worker will win this prize. Notice that      is determined by the manager, but must be 
internalized by the employee if they wish to maximize their payoffs. When the manager is making their 
decision, the interpretation of observed effort will likely be “noisy.” To account for this, the model will 
include a random variable which will be added to the productivity of each employee. This will be the 
employee output that a manager will use when making their decisions. This falls in line with the 
explanation of a random measurement error brought up by O'Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984). The 
main point of the error is that a manager may not distinguish between workers when their efforts are fairly 
close together. We will further make a simplifying assumption that the noise is a random iid term that is 
uniformly distributed with mean zero around [-a,a]. Thus, player i wins the prize M if their effort plus the 
noise term is greater than the discounted effort plus the noise term of the outside worker, or            
          or,            is equal to Pr (                                                        
where            . Under these conditions, the probability a worker wins the prize is reduced to finding the density of the sum of the two random variables (   and   ). This is carried out in the Appendix, and 
we find that             
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In the above, notice that the distribution of Z determines the structure of F(Z). Given these 
assumptions, a PSNE exists. Note that there is no PSNE if there are no random shocks. This is because 
without the random term, an increase in effort will lead to an increase in the probability of winning the 
prize with certainty. If this were the case, the in-group worker will always be able to best the out-group 
worker and any effort the out-group worker chooses, the in-group worker will choose effort slightly above 
this. Through iterative reasoning, this would eventually lead the out-group worker to contribute nothing 
and the in-group worker to contribute slightly above that amount. But if this were the case, then the out-
group worker would contribute slightly more than the in-group worker and the process continues 
cyclically. Thus, the random component guarantees that if a worker increases their effort above 
equilibrium effort levels, they will not win the prize with 100% certainty. If a worker is using a strict 
money maximizing strategy, they will maximize the above expected payoffs and set marginal benefits 
equal to marginal costs, or: 
  
   
   




   
   
   
 
         
In the Appendix it is shown that           which results in the equilibrium effort levels for the in-group 
worker: 
  
   
    
                
           
and for the out-group worker: 
  
       
    
                
           
. From (3) and (4), we see that if the employees are risk-neutral, the in-group worker will contribute more 
effort than the out-group worker.
 7 Notice that the two efforts are equal except one is discounted by  . 
This leads to the first proposition. 
Proposition 1: The in-group employee will contribute more than the out-group employee and the 
out-group employee will contribute less than the in-group employee. 
What is also apparent from (3) and (4) is that both workers will contribute more as   increases or as social 
distance decreases. This is easy to see from the derivatives of equilibrium effort levels w.r.t.    
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                   .This leads to the second proposition: 
Proposition 2: Overall work effort will decline as social distance increases. 
For comparison purposes, it is useful to point out that if social distance did not exist (      , the 
equilibrium effort levels reduce to: 
  
   
  
  
         
This result holds if both workers are from the in-group or both workers are from the out-group. This gives 
proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: Work effort will be highest when both workers share the same social connections 
with the manager.  
 
2.2 Risk Averse Workers 
With risk neutral workers, there will be no difference in the predictions about work effort between a WTA 
contest and a proportional contest. The assumption of risk neutrality is often questioned and will thus be 
relaxed in this section. In this setting, that means that the workers must account for their own risk 
aversion and that of their co-workers which has been shown to be not analytically solvable for the more 
realistic heterogeneous risk parameters (see Skaperdas and Gan, 1995; Cornes and Hartley, 2003). For the 
purposes of this exposition, it will suffice to show the comparative statics with homogeneous constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) when one type of contest is compared to the other. While this will give the 
basic prediction indicating how individuals respond to different levels of risk aversion, heterogeneous risk 
                                                           
7 The above analysis follows closely the results obtained by Bull et al. (1987) preferences will eventually be econometrically controlled for. With this in mind, we will assume a 
standard CRRA utility function of the form           where y is wealth and         is the risk 
aversion parameter where       represents a risk-averse person.  It will be sufficient to show the 
comparison of the in-group worker as the result of the out-group worker has the same comparative statics. 
For the proportional contest, the utility for the in-group worker is now:  












         
For the winner take all contest, the in-group worker has utility: 






           
In the above, and in the experimental design,     
  
 
   for all feasible    . To understand how effort will 
vary in the two contests, we must find the optimal effort in each reward scenario and compare efforts 
from the two. The optimal effort in (8) is the same as (3), or: 
  
     
  





The optimal effort in (7) is somewhat more complex: 
  
   




    
     
 




      
    
 




      
  
   




    
     
 




    
    
The simplest examination of the comparative statics is done through fixing the parameter values and 
graphing the utilities as seen in Figure 1. This figure shows how the utility functions change as effort 
increases. The solid line represents utility in the proportional contest while the dashed line represents the 
utility in the WTA contest. From this graph, notice that optimal work effort in the WTA is greater than 
that in the proportional contest. This leads to the final Proposition. 
Proposition 4: Risk-averse workers will contribute more effort in the WTA contest than the 
proportional contest.  
Figure 1: Comparative statics of optimal effort with risk-aversion  
3. Experimental Design 
Since the main point of the paper is to determine if subjects act as theory predicts when social distance is 
present, subjects played three main games which are meant to separate out other confounds. In order to 
test the above predictions, 108 subjects were recruited to one of 9 sessions at The Ohio State University 
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment lasted about an hour where the subjects made an average 
of $22.32. Out of the 108 subjects; 2/3 were assigned to play the role of an employee, 42 of whom were 
assigned to the proportional contest.  
Once in the lab, subjects were asked to fill out a consent form. After all consent forms were 
collected, instructions were handed out for the first part.
8 The subjects were not told how many parts were 
in the experiment and only knew that they were recruited for 1 ½ hours. In the first part, subjects were 
asked to choose which painting they preferred out of five pairs that were shown at the front of the room. 
The paintings were done by either Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky.
9 This methodology has been used to 
generate a salient group identity in psychology for some time (Tajfel, Billig, and Claude, 1971) and more 
recently in Economics (Chen and Li 2009). Subjects were next divided into two groups, where the first 
group (group A) was comprised of 2/3 of them who preferred Klee more often than the other 1/3 while 
                                                           
8 Instructions are available in the appendix. 
9 The paintings by Klee were Ancient Sound, Abstract on Black; Red Balloon; Carnival in the Mountains; 
Paukenspieler; Angelus Novus and the ones by Kandinsky were Transverse Line; Fugue; Yellow-Red-Blue; Black 
Spot I; Orange. 













Utilitythe rest were in the second group (group B).
10 The experimental participants next had the opportunity to 
meet and talk with others in their group where everyone in group A met at the front of the room and 
everyone in group B met in the back. They were given topics to discuss and were encouraged to get to 
know the others in their group. This aspect of the design was used to strengthen the group identity and 
more closely mimics the environment of interest. Buchan, Johnson and Croson (2006) found this kind of 
“personal communication” increased other regarding preferences. After 10 minutes, everyone was called 
back to their seats to begin the paying portion of the experiment. 
  To test the above predictions, three main pieces of information will be needed which will be 
provided by the following games. In all three games, the payoff to the employees will be equal to the 
amount of the prize given to them by the manager plus their initial endowment minus their cost of effort 
or: 
       




Where m   [0,M] is the amount given to the employee by the manager. Though not the interest of the 
paper, the payoff to the manager will just be the amount both employees contribute to them multiplied by 
2 to mimic a productive activity. Because of the complexity of the employee payoffs, subjects in this role 
were given an on-screen calculator where they could calculate potential payoffs before they made their 
decisions final. Within group A, 1/2 of the subjects were assigned the manager role, while the other 1/2 
were in the role of an employee; everyone in group B was an employee.
11 Subjects then played the 
following three games in groups of 3; one manager and two employees where the matchings were 
randomly made and at no point did any subject know specifically who they were matched with. In all the 
games, each subject's group affiliation was common knowledge. Before each game, instructions were 
handed out and read out loud and screenshots were shown at the front of the room to ensure that every 
subject knew what each type would see so that all information was common knowledge. The experiment 
was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).The three games were played in two main treatments; 
where the prize, M, is non-divisible (winner take all contest), or when it is divisible (proportional contest). 
The data is used from 4 periods of the game, where there is one period of Games 1 & 2 and two periods of 
                                                           
10 Ties were broken randomly 
11 Neutral wording was used in the experiment where the managers were told they were a type A player and the 
employees a type B while groups were labeled “Group 1” and “Group 2.”  Game 3.
12 The parameter values chosen for the experiment are represented to the subjects as tokens and 
are I = 100, M = 300 and c = 100. The subjects were paid on an exchange rate of 1 token = $0.01. 
Game 1:  
 In this first game, the employees and managers moved simultaneously and were in a group comprised of 
one manager (who is always from group A), one employee from group A and one employee from group 
B. Notice when the matchings are made in this manner, the employee from group A is from the same 
group as the manager who together form the in-group while the person from group B forms the out-group. 
Both the employees and the manager started out with an endowment of money. The endowment that the 
manager had, M, can be viewed as the amount of the prize they must give and the amount the employee 
starts with can be seen as how much effort they can potentially give to productive activities. The 
employees must choose how much of their endowment to keep and how much to give to the manager who 
will either be in their group or not. In order to mimic a productive activity, their contributions to the 
manager will be doubled. The manager’s decision was to decide how much of their endowment to give to 
someone in their own group and how much to give to someone in the other group with no option to keep 
any for herself. Neither the employees nor the manager were able to observe the allocation of the 
person(s) they were matched with when they made their allocation decisions.  This will give an estimate 
of in-group bias (ʴ in the model) which will be used in game 3. Because of the simultaneous nature of the 
moves of the manager and the employees, there will be no competition amongst employees for the prize 
in this game.  
Game 2: 
Propositions 2 and 3 rely on knowing how employees compete for the reward in the absence of social 
distance. Game 2 was designed to address these hypotheses. This game was similar to Game 1 except the 
moves were sequential where employees moved first and after seeing the employees’ decisions, the 
manager decided their allocation choices. To make certain social distance is the same for the employees, 
both were from the same group. So, both employees were either from the group A or group B.  The theory 
does not distinguish between which group the employees belong to as long as they both belong to the 
same group. This game will serve as a baseline for competition when social distance is the same for both 
employees.  
Game 3: 
                                                           
12 There were another two periods of game three which were played but there was a software glitch for these periods 
so the data won’t be used. It was verified that the two periods of data used are not different thus the periods with the 
unused data had no statistical effect on the data being used. This game is similar to Game 2 except the employees are now from different groups and were shown the 
in-group bias of the manager which was determined from the manager’s decision in Game 1. Propositions 
1 and 2 rely on employees knowing the bias thus it is important to make sure employees knew the 
advantage or disadvantage they face. This game mimics employees competing for a reward when social 
distance is present. This game was repeated twice where the matchings were randomized each time.  
Since the theory relies on beliefs of the competing employee’s chosen effort, a belief-elicitation 
mechanism was implemented after the second iteration of game 3. Subjects did not know this task was 
coming when they played game 3 and was only played by employees. Subjects were paid using a 
quadratic scoring rule (Palfrey and Wang, 2009) based on how close their guess was to the actual 
contributions of the other employee matched to the same manager as them. In addition to the above 
games, Proposition 4 requires that a subject’s risk preferences be accounted for. To accomplish this, a 
traditional Holt-Laury risk assessment test (Holt and Laury 2002) was given to the subjects.  
 
4. Results 
  Though not the focus of the current study, the behavior of the manager will be examined first. It 
is important to analyze this for two basic reasons. First, since mediated contests are rarely used to study 
competition, a manager’s decision in this setting is not well known. More importantly though, it is 
pertinent to examine managerial decisions since testing the above propositions relies on understanding if 
managers show a bias to in-group workers and if so, the size of this bias.  The summary statistics for 
managers are given in Table 1.  There are a couple of things that stand out. First, on average, managers 
give 18 percentage points more to in-group workers than out-group workers in Game 1. This advantage 
represents   in the above equations. Notice also that even though managers receive only 53% of their 
income from in-group workers in Game 3, they give them 62% of the total prize. Controlling for the extra 
6% given them by the in-group workers, the managers decision in Game 3 is consistent with the 
advantage seen in Game 1 of 18 percentage points. This means that the advantage given to the employees 
in Game 3 wasn’t completely earned.  
Now that the manager’s in-group bias has been established, we will turn our attention to 
employee behavior and Proposition 1. Proposition 1 states in-group workers (IGW) will contribute more 
than out-group workers (OGW) and OGW will contribute less than IGW. To test this proposition, the 
results from game 3 will be examined. Table 2 gives the summary statistics for employee contributions 
while Table 3 gives regression results of Game 3.  Table 1: Managers’ Decisions and Payoffs 
  % Given by Manager       
  In-Group  Out-
Group 
Statistical test for 
difference 
Sequential Move?  % of Managers 
income from In-
Group  
Game 1  59%  41%  t-test, p < .01 
Wilcoxon, p < 
.01 
No  52% 
Game 2  50%  50%  N/A  Yes  51% 
Game 3  62%  38%  t-test, p < .01 
Wilcoxon, p < 
.01 
Yes  53% 
Note: By design, in Game 2 the manager had to give exactly 50% to in-group and 50% to out-group. 
We can see in table 2 that the difference in chosen effort in game 3 between in- and out-group 
employees is not found to be statistically significant. What becomes immediately evident from looking at 
Game 3 results though is that contributions are much different for males than females (61% vs. 36%).  In 
this study, 45 of the subjects assigned to play the role of an employee were male. Previous studies have 
shown gender is important in competitive outcomes (e.g. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Niederle 
and Vesterlund, 2007, 2010; Sutter and Rützler, 2010; Wozniak, Harbaugh and Mayr, 2010; Gupta,  
Poulsen and Villeval, 2011). The basic finding of these studies that women compete less than men is also 
true of the current study as males contributed 69% of their endowment to the manager while females 
contributed 50% (differences are confirmed statistically; t-test, p < .01, Wicoxon, p < .01).  
 
Table 2: Employees’ Decisions 
  % Given by Employee to the 
Manager 
   
  In-Group  Out-Group  Statistical test for 
difference 
Sequential Move? 
Game 1  35%  32%  t-test, p =.59 
Wilcoxon, p =.81 
No Game 2  65%  63%  t-test, p = .79 
Wilcoxon, p = .94 
Yes 
Game 3  66%  58%  t-test, p =.19 
Wilcoxon, p = .20 
Yes 
Game 3 - WTA  74%  63%  t-test, p =.33 
Wilcoxon, p =.24 
Yes 
Game 3 - 
Proportional 
61%  54%  t-test, p =.38 
Wilcoxon, p =.48 
Yes 
Game 3 - Male  70%  69%  t-test, p =.84 
Wilcoxon, p =.57 
Yes 
Game 3 - 
Female 
61%  36%  t-test, p =.01 
Wilcoxon, p < .01 
Yes 
 
To control for gender and other relevant factors, Table 3 presents regression analysis of Game 3.
13 
The dependent variable is the number of tokens out of 100 each employee gave to their manager. Model 1 
includes dummy variables for In-Group and Female. It is shown that once gender is controlled for, in-
group workers contributed more than out-group workers. Looking back at Table 2 though, we can see this 
is likely due to a specification error and that the results are likely driven by the female out-group worker.  
Model 2 in Table 3 adds an interaction between In-Group and Female to Model 1 while Model 3 adds the 
dummy variable for WTA. From the most complete Model  3, it is evident that female IGW contribute 
much more than female OGW. This gives us our first result. Table 2 shows that the difference in 
contributions of in-group females is confirmed higher than out-group females     
Result 1: In-group Females contributed more tokens to their manager than out-group females. 
Table 3: Regression analysis of the amount the employee gives to the manager. 
  Model 1  Model 2    Model 4 
                                                           
13 For simplicity, Table 3 only presents the results of a standard OLS regression. Note that because of the use of only 
two periods of data, not much is gained from using panel data methods such as a random effects model or clustering. 
Nonetheless, for robustness an additional table is included in the Appendix where all of the Models are re-ran with 
these features. Variable  Model 3 
 




























Holt-Laury     
  -1.94* 
(1.04) 
Advantage  from  the 
Manager     
  -0.01 
(0.04) 








Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
From Table 2 it is shown that there is no statistical difference between the contributions of male 
IGW and male OGW. Once again, a more careful analysis is carried out in Table 3 and results using t-
tests and Wilcoxon tests will be taken in concert with the regression results in Table 3.  The effect of 
being a male IGW is captured in the variable for “In-Group” in Models 2 and 3. It is shown in these two 
models that being in the in-group is neither economically important for males nor statistically significant 
in any of the 3 Models.
14   
Result 2: In-group males did not contribute significantly more tokens to their manager than out-
group males. 
The equilibria found in the preceding section requires players to best respond based on correct 
beliefs about what the other player will do. To this end, the results from the belief elicitation task can be 
utilized to get a better idea of the underlying causes driving behavior.  After decisions were made in the 
final round of Game 3, employees were asked to make an incentivized guess as to how many tokens they 
thought the person they were paired with in that period contributed. Combined with the allocation 
                                                           
14 Because of the complexities of how gender may interact with other explanatory variables, many more tests were 
ran, but are omitted for brevity. None were found to add any insight above what is given in the included tables. As 
an example, it was examined whether females and males had asymmetric responses based on their respective risk 
attitudes and it was found that this is not the case. Another avenue explored was using game 2 decisions as a proxy 
for inequality aversion.  decisions, we will be able to tell if subjects are contributing more than, less than or equal to what they 
think their counterparts contributed. 
In the final period of Game 3, in-group females contributed 68 tokens to the manager and they 
thought their out-group counterpart contributed 44. This difference is confirmed statistically (t-test, p = 
.03; Wilcoxon, p = .07). In the same period, out-group females contributed 34 while they thought their in-
group counterpart contributed 44, though this difference is not confirmed statistically (t-test, p = .26; 
Wilcoxon, p = .31). Males, regardless of group, also contributed more than they believed their co-worker 
did. In-group males contributed 69 tokens while they thought their counterparts contributed 49 (t-test, p = 
.05; Wilcoxon, p = .02) while male OGW contributed 73 and thought the IGW contributed 45 (t-test, p = 
.05; Wilcoxon, p = .02).  
Result 3: Males and in-group females contributed significantly more than what they believed a 
co-worker contributed while it could not be confirmed that out-group females contributed less 
than what they thought their in-group counterparts contributed. 
We will now explore the predictions of Proposition 2. Proposition 2 states that as the advantage 
from being in the in-group increases, overall work effort will decline. To test this, Model 4 in Table 3 
includes a continuous variable, “Advantage from the Manager”, which accounts for how many of the 300 
tokens the manager gave to someone from their own group in Game 1.The variable measuring the 
advantage from the manager varies anywhere from 0 to 300 with the average being 178, a standard error 
of 10.5 and a 95% confidence interval ranging from 156 to 199. With this much variation, any effect 
coming from an increase in the advantage (or disadvantage) should be able to be identified in the 
econometric model. As seen in Model 4, the coefficient for this variable fails to reach statistical 
significance.
15 
Result 4: Employee contributions to the manager do not vary with the strength of the advantage 
(disadvantage) given to the in-group worker (out-group worker).  
We will now turn our attention to Proposition 3. Table 4 compares the amount given by 
employees in Games 2 and 3. This table shows that there is only one instance where the difference 
between contributions in Game 2 and Game 3 is shown to be statistically significant, and this is only 
found using the Wilcoxon test but the result does not hold when using a t-test.  
                                                           
15It can be argued that subjects view the advantage (or disadvantage) more broadly, or with some noise. For 
instance, it could be the case that they view 160 and 170 similarly. To test this other methods of classifying this 
“advantage” were used where the variable was categorized into broader categories and none were found to affect 
contributions. Table 4: Employees’ Decisions in Game 2 compared to Game 3 
  % Given by Employee   
  Game 2  Game 3  Statistical test for difference 
Total  64%  62%  t-test, p = .59 
Wilcoxon, p = .35 
In-Group  64%  66%  t-test, p = .68 
Wilcoxon, p = .51 
Out-Group  63%  58%  t-test, p = .17 
Wilcoxon, p = .04 
Male  70%  69%  t-test, p = .88 
Wilcoxon, p = .75 
Female  53%  50%  t-test, p = .49 
Wilcoxon, p = .23 
 
Result 5: There is no difference in employee contributions to the manager when employees are 
competing for the reward with someone from their own group or with someone from the other 
group.  
This leads to the final untested Proposition. Proposition 4 states that because of risk aversion, 
work effort is greater in the WTA contest than the Proportional contest. We can see from Model 3 that the 
sign of the coefficient for “WTA” is both positive and significant meaning contributions from the 
employees to the manager is greater in the WTA contest than in the Proportional contest. For 
completeness, model 4 includes an additional variable, “HL”, which captures the results of a Holt-Laury 
risk-aversion test. It is evident from Model 4 that the WTA variable is still positive and highly 
significant.
16  
Result 6: The contributions in the WTA contest are much greater than those in the Proportional 
contest. 
                                                           
16 When breaking the data down by gender, males are found to contribute more in the WTA contest than in the 
Proportional contest (t-test, p = .05, Wilcoxon, p = .02) while there is no difference for females (t-test, p = .53, 
Wilcoxon, p = .70). 5. Discussion 
  The aim of this paper is to determine if people view the in-group (or out-group) bias between 
themselves and their manager as theory predicts and what effect this will have on work effort when the 
employees are competing for a reward given out by the manager. It was found that females behave more 
or less as the theory predicts, while males do not. More specifically, females who were in the in-group 
contributed significantly more effort than females in the out-group while there was no difference in the 
contributions of males. In fact, there is no statistical difference in the contributions of female in-group 
employees and male employees (t-test, p = .24; Wilcoxon, p = .13). There are several implications from 
these findings.  
First, these results may give additional insight into the gender pay gap. A large unaccounted for 
differential still exists which is currently attributed to discrimination (Blau and Kahn, 2000). The results 
of this experiment suggest that females are much more sensitive to social distance in this setting. Thus, if 
females view themselves as part of the out-group and workers are paid, at least partially, based on their 
perceived effort, we should expect female workers to make less than male workers if the results of the 
experiment hold. This can by no means be the entire explanation of the difference in the gender pay gap, 
but may serve as an additional explanation of some of the unexplained differences.  
Second, there is a large body of literature which show that females contribute less in competitive 
environments than males (e.g. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 
2010; Sutter and Rützler, 2010; Wozniak, Harbaugh and Mayr, 2010; Gupta,  Poulsen and Villeval, 
2011). The findings of the current study show that if employees are included in the managements social 
group, this effect may go away, or be lessened to a large extent for females. This should be an 
encouraging finding for the recent interest in group identity (Chen and Li 2009) and should increase the 
importance of such works as the Eckel and Grossman (2005) study which carefully dissects how to create 
team identity to reduce social distance.  
Lastly, there is also encouraging news that work effort is much higher when competition is 
present than when it is not. This can be seen by comparing the results from Game 1 with Game 2 and 
Game 3. In all cases, competition leads to higher overall effort levels (t-test, p < .01; Wilcoxon, p < .01). 
So, the efficacy of the reward mechanism can be improved as mentioned above, but the inclusion of 
social distance does not drive behavior below what is observed with no competition at all.  
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Appendix A: Proof of   
  (3) and   
  (4).  
With a non-linear cost function, the workers have expected payoffs of: 
 




                            
  
 
   
 
 
     
Where I is total effort available, M is the value of the prize, c is a constant cost parameter and      is the 
probability the worker will win this prize. If a worker is using a strict money maximizing strategy, they 
will maximize the above expected payoffs and set marginal benefits equal to marginal costs, or: 
 
  
   
   




   
   
   
   
 
 
     
Actual decisional work effort will take the form: 
             
For         and where    is a random iid shock that is uniformly distributed with mean zero around [-
a,a]. Thus, the player wins the prize M if         which means that the probability an agent wins, 
         , is equal to Pr (                                                        where            . 
To solve for the PSNE, we must figure out the probability a worker wins the prize which requires finding 
the density of the sum of the two random variables. Notice that the pdf of Z is just the triangular 
distribution ranging from -2a to 2a with a mean at 0 and a maximum at 
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And the density function for the sum is  
                   
 
  
                                              
Because of (3), (4) becomes: 
        
 
  
          
 
  
       
Note that the integrand is 0 unless                                       . This sets up two different 
densities for z. The first is when            . In this case, 
         
 
  






                
where      
 
    is the CDF of the uniform which is  
   




     
  
  
      
  





    
Similarly, when           ,  





    
Notice, the convolution of two uniform distribution functions is just the triangular distribution with 
known CDF: 
      
 
   
 
   
 
















                                
                                                       
  
 
From this, the PSNE can be outlined. First, note that 
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 . Combining this with (2), we get that      
  
 . Using this, we know that in equilibrium            which means that 
  
   
  
 
    
      
     
 
    
       
     which, combined with (2) leads to the 
optimal effort level. 
 
  
   
    
                
       
For the in-group worker and 
  
   
     
                
       
for the out-group worker. 
    
Appendix B: Robustness checks of Table 3 
Table 3a: Random effects model with clustering at the subject level. 
 
Variable 

































Holt-Laury     
  -1.94* 
(1.17) 
Advantage  from  the 
Manager     
  -0.02 
(0.02) 








Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Appendix C: Instructions-Proportional 
 
  This is an experiment on the economics of decision making. In addition to your participation fee, 
you will have the chance to earn money based on your decisions and the decisions of others. It is 
extremely important that you put away all materials including external reading material and turn off your 
cell phones and any other electronic devices. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will 
come by and answer it privately. 
  In today’s first task you will be shown five pairs of paintings and for each pair you will be asked 
to indicate which you like better. Each set of paintings will be shown on the projection screen at the front 
of the room and in each pair one will be labeled A with the other B. On your computer screen, you will 
choose either A or B, where your choice corresponds to the painting you like the best. There is no right or 
wrong answer here, so choose which one you like best.    The paintings previously shown were either done by two different painters named Paul Klee and 
Wassily Kandinsky. You will now be divided into two groups where Group 1 comprises two-thirds of you 
who chose Klee more often than the other one-third (Note: ties are broken randomly). Thus, you will be 
grouped with others whose preferences for the paintings match your own. So, if you are in Group 1, you 
will be matched with others who prefer paintings by Klee over Kandinsky more often than those in Group 
2 and if you are in Group 2 you are grouped with others who prefer Kandinsky over Klee more often than 
those in Group 1. On your computer screen, you will notice that it shows which group you belong to. You 
will remain in the same group for the duration of the experiment. Thus, if you are now in Group 1, you 
will always remain in Group 1 and similarly for those of you in Group 2. In a moment, you will get 
together with others in your group to get to know them. Below are some suggested topics to discuss, but 
feel free to talk about other things but use this time to get to know others in your group. You will have 10 
minutes to talk, and after this time, I will call you back to your seats. At this time, if you are in Group 1, 
please meet with your group members at the front of the room and if you are from Group 2, please meet at 
the back of the room.  
Suggested discussion topics: 
1.  If you could be any superhero and have super powers, which one would you like to have and 
why? 
2.  If you could transport yourself anywhere instantly, where would you go and why? 
3.  What is one item that you really should throw away, but probably never will? 
4.  What is your favorite musical act? 
5.  What’s your favorite cartoon character, and why?  
6.  What’s the ideal dream job for you? 
7.  What thought or message would you want to put in a fortune cookie? 
8.  If you had to give up a favorite food, which would be the most difficult to give up? 
9.  What is one food you’d never want to taste again? 
10. If you won a lottery ticket and had a million dollars, what would you do with it? 
11. You’ve been given access to a time machine.  Where and when would you travel to? 
12. In your opinion, which animal is the best (or most beautiful) and why? 
  For the remainder of the experiment, please do not talk with those around you. If you have a 
question, please raise your hand and I will come answer it. Remember, your group remains fixed for the 
entire experiment. If you are in Group 1, you and the others in Group 1 prefer Klee paintings more than 
those in Group 2 and if you are in Group 2 you and the others in Group 2 prefer Kandinsky paintings 
more than those in Group 1. Your group is also comprised of the same people you just chatted with. 
Additional to your group assignment, you will also be assigned to either be an A player or a B player. 
You will remain in this role for the entirety of the experiment. If you look on your computer screen, you 
will notice which role you have been assigned. If you are in Group 1, your role has been randomly 
determined by the computer. If you are in Group 2, you are automatically a B player.  
There are multiple tasks in today’s experiment. The instructions below describe period 1.  
  If you are a B player, you have been matched with an A player. You will begin with 100 tokens 
and your task is to decide how to split the 100 tokens with the A player you are matched with. Tokens 
that you choose to keep will generate 1 cent to you. Each token you choose to pass to the A player will be worth 2 cents to them and     
  
     cents to you where x is the amount passed to the A player. As an 
example, if you allocated 50 tokens to the A player and kept 50, the A player you are matched with will 
receive 100 cents and you will receive               
   
       75 cents. There is a "Test" button that you 
can press if you would like to see the outcomes of any potential choices. Once you have made your final 
allocation decisions, you must hit the "Continue" button. In addition to this payment, you will also receive 
some amount allocated to you from an A player through a decision they will be making that will be 
described in a moment. You will not see how much was allocated to you by this person when you make 
your decision and they will not see how much you allocated to them when they make their decision. The 
only information you will be shown is if the person you are matched with is in the same group as you or 
not. Please look at the overhead for an example of the screen that B players will see.  
  If you are an A player, you have been paired with two B players, one from your own group and 
one from the other group. Your task is to decide how to allocate 300 cents between the two B players. 
You may allocate the tokens in any proportion you wish, but the total amount allocated must equal 300 
and you do not have the option of keeping any for yourself. Every token you allocate to a B player will 
not cost you anything. When making your allocation decisions, you will be told which group the B 
players are from but not what their allocation decisions were. Once you enter the amounts you wish to 
allocate to the B players, you must hit the "Continue" button to move on. Your payment for this round is 
based on the decisions of B players, but you will not observe their decisions when you make your 
allocation choices and they will not observe your decisions when they make their choices. Please look at 
the overhead for an example of the screen that A players will see. 
 
 
Summary: Your prior membership in Group 1 or 2 remains from the previous exercise and you 
have now been assigned to be either an A player or a B player. You will remain in the same roles and 
groups for the rest of the experiment. If you are a B player, your task is to decide how much of your 
endowment to allocate to an A player and how much to keep. If you are an A player, your task is to 
decide how to allocate 300 cents between someone in your group (Group 1) and the other group (Group 
2) with no option to keep any for yourself. You will do this only once. Note: all A players are from Group 
1 and the B players are split evenly into Group 1 and Group 2. After everyone has made their allocation 
decisions, the first period will be concluded and we will move on to the next task. Are there any 
questions? 
  Remember, you will remain in the same group and role for the entire experiment. If you are in 
Group 1, you and the others in your group prefer Klee paintings more than those in Group 2 and if you are 
in Group 2 you and the others in your group prefer Kandinsky paintings more than those in Group 1. 
Your group is also comprised of the same people you just chatted with.   
The following instructions apply for period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the computer will 
randomly assign two B players to be matched with one A player. The two B players will both be from the 
same group. Thus, if you are in Group 1, the B player matched to the same A player as you is also from 
Group 1 and similarly for Group 2. The tasks in this period are similar to those from the last period except the A players will now observe the decisions of the B players before they make their decisions about 
allocating their endowment between the two B players.   
As before, if you are a B player, you must decide how many of your 100 tokens to allocate to the 
A player you are matched with and how many to keep. There is another B player also matched to the 
same A player as you who will be simultaneously making the same decision as you about how much of 
their endowment to allocate to the A player. Tokens that you choose to keep will generate 1 cent to you. 
Each token you choose to pass to the A player will be worth 2 cents to them and     
  
     cents to you 
where x is the amount passed to the A player. The only information B players will be given when they 
make their allocation decisions is if the A player is in the same group as them or not. Please look at the 
overhead for an example of the screen that B players will see. 
    After both B players have made their choice the A player will observe the allocation 
decisions of both B players and which group they are from before they decide how many of the 300 
tokens to give to each B player. So unlike in the previous period when the A player was making their 
allocation decision knowing only the group membership of the B players, the A player will now be 
dividing up the 300 cents with full knowledge of the decisions made by the B players regarding how 
much of their endowments the B players each decided to pass to an A player. Please look at the overhead 
for an example of the screen that A players will see. 
Summary: For this part of the experiment, two B players will again be matched with one A 
player. This time though, both B players will be from the same group and will make their decisions before 
the A players. A players will see the allocation decisions of the two B players they are matched with 
before they make their decisions. After everyone has made their allocation decisions, the second period 
will be concluded. This task will only be completed once. Again, all A players are from Group 1 and the 
B players are split evenly into Group 1 and Group 2. After everyone has made their allocation decisions, 
we will move on to the next task. Are there any questions? 
  The following instructions apply for periods 3-5. Remember, if you are in Group 1, you and the 
others in your group prefer Klee paintings more than those in Group 2 and if you are in Group 2 you and 
the others in your group prefer Kandinsky paintings more than those in Group 1. Your group is also 
comprised of the same people you chatted with in the beginning. At the beginning of period 3, the 
computer will again randomly assign two B players to be paired with one A player. The two B players 
now will be from different groups. Thus, if you are from Group 1, the other B player matched to the same 
A player as you will be from Group 2. Otherwise the decisions will be made as before. Type B players 
will make an allocation decision between themselves and the A player with whom they are matched with 
and then after observing how much the two B players send to them, the A player will choose how to 
divide up 300 cents. In addition to this, the B players will be able to observe the first period allocation 
decisions of the A player they are matched with. Specifically, the B players will be able to see how many 
tokens the A player they are matched with previously allocated to someone in Group 1 and how many 
they allocated to someone in Group 2. Remember, this is the period where the A players could not 
observe what the B players did when they made their decisions. After B players make their allocation 
decisions, A players observe these results before they make their allocation decisions.  Please look at the 
overhead for an example of the screens that A and B players will see.  This will be repeated for 3 periods. After the initial period, B players will observe what the other 
B player chose in the previous period but not see the decisions of the A players. Please look at the 
overhead for an example of the screen that B players will see.  
The A or B player(s) you are matched with will remain fixed for the 3 periods.  
   Summary: For this part of the experiment, two B players will again be matched with one A 
player. This time though, the B players will be from different groups. They will still make their decisions 
before the A players. In addition to this, the B players will observe the first period allocation decisions of 
the A players and they will observe what the other B player contributed the prior period. A players will 
see the allocation decisions of the two B players they are matched with and which group each B player 
belongs to before they make their decisions. This is repeated for 3 periods. Again, all A players are from 
Group 1 and the B players are split evenly into Group 1 and Group 2. Are there any questions? 
For period 6, if you are a B player, you are now paired with a different A player. If you are an A player, 
you are now paired with two different B players. Otherwise, all rules from the previous part are the same.  
The following instructions are for period 7. If you are a B player, you and another B player from a 
different group were matched with an A player last period. Your task is to try and guess how many tokens 
the other B player contributed the last period. Earnings in this period are tied to how close your guess is. 
If you correctly guess what they contributed, you will get an additional 300 cents. If you do not guess 
correctly, your earnings will be determined by the following formula: 
         
 
   
                                       
If for instance, the other B player contributed 30 tokens and you guessed 40. This would mean that you 
would receive      
 
                    cents. If you instead guessed 50, you would receive      
 
                    cents. Thus, notice that the farther you are away from the actual allocation, the 
amount you will receive decreases quickly.  
If you are an A player, you will do nothing 
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This study examines how employees internalize dierences in social distance between
themselves and their managers when they are competing for a reward given by the
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between the employer and the various employees leads to a disadvantageous situation
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